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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

HAROLD HARRIS,

Case No.

12497

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal by the defendant Harold
Harris from his conviction and sentence for the crimes
of rape, robbery and second degree kidnapping rendered
in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber
County, the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge, presiding.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendant, after a trial before a jury, was found
guilty of the crimes of rape, robbery, and second degree
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kidnapping and was sentenced for terms of not less than
ten years, not less than five years which may be for life,
and not less than one year which may be for life, respectively.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State seeks an affirmance of the defendant's
conviction for the crimes of rape, robbery and second
degree kidnapping.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent stipulates that the facts as stated
by the appellant are correct, but submits the following
addition:
While enroute to the motel, Burney informed Harris
that Miss Edwards had a $50 bill. Burney then told Miss
Edwards to give him the bill, which she did (T. 141-142).
When Burney asked for the rest of the money in her
purse, Harris told him to let Miss Edwards keep the five
and the ones (T. 173).
At one point Harris became nervous because Miss
Edwards was visible in the back seat. The car was stopped
and Miss Edwards was made to lie down while Burney
rode in front (T. 142). This same precaution of secrecy
was taken on the return drive to Roy.
While Miss Edwards was in the bathroom dressing,
Harris handed her blouse through the door and she was
able to see the side of his face and arm at which time she

observed his dark brown, brushed-back hair, his hairline,
long sideburns, skin texture, shirt and coat (T. 161-163).
When she saw Harris again at the preliminary hearing
Miss Edwards recognized his facial characteristics from
her observations in the motel room and at that time identified him as being one of the offenders (T. 107).
Harris was informed of his rights, including the right
to counsel, by Officer Nebeker at the time of the arrest
(T. 268). Even though one officer acknowledged that
an attorney may have been requested at the time of the
arrest he could not remember which one may have made
the request.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LINEUP IN WHICH HARRIS PARTICIPATED WAS AT ALL TIMES CONDUCTED PROPERLY AND WAS NOT IN
VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS.
Harris was placed in the lineup in the clothes which
he said were his at the time of the arrest. The fact that
the victim recognized Harris' clothes should not prejudice
her recognition and subsequent identification of him.
Appellant's objection to clothing recognition and identification, if sustained, would impose a burden upon the lineup procedure and substantially reduce its practicality as
a method of identification.
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This Court's opinion in State v. Ervin, 22 Utah 2d
216, 451 P. 2d 372 (1969), relied on by appellant, stresses
the importance of keeping the lineup procedure free of
such burdens:
"Ideally it [the lineup] should be regarded
as having a dual purpose. On the one hand: to
help in searching out and identifying those guilty
of crime. On the other, the equally important
corallary: to protect those who are suspected of
crime but who are innocent. To best serve both
purposes the procedure should be handled with
caution not to place blame on the innocent, and
yet not so laden with difficulties nor burden with
super-cautions as to make it impractical as a
method of identifying the guilty." Id. at 220-221.
The California Supreme Court rejected what appellant proposes here, in People v. Floyd, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608,
464 P. 2d 64, (1970):
"Milton contends, however, that the lineup
is unfair because he was required to wear the
trousers in which he was arrested, the right cuff
of which was loose. We are, however, cited to no
authority for the proposition that it is a denial
of due process to require a suspect to wear the
clothes in which he was arrested. Id. at 75.
"There was no need for the police to match
the outfits of everyone in the lineup any more
than the police were required to match the physical proportions of the other men with scientific
exactitude. Id. at 76.
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"It is true that Mrs. Foster conceded that it
would be 'a fair statement' that she remembered
the pants worn by Milton more than anything else
about him, but that concession hardly qualifies as
a statement that her recollection was directed
'solely' to his trousers." Id. at 76.
A.

In-court identification was based on independent source.

If, in the alternative, it should be determined that
the lineup was improper, the in-court identification of
Harris had an independent source and was not tainted
by suggestion from the lineup. State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah
2d 277, 451 P. 2d 786 (1969).

Miss Edwards did not, in fact, identify Harris at the
lineup. She told her father that Harris was familiar but
did not tell police because they had stressed that she
was to make only positive identification.
The Supreme Court in United State v. Wade, 388
U. S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967),
reasoned that the in-court identification of Wade would
be admitted if"... the in-court identifications were based
upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup
identification." Id. at 240.
In Wade, the Court relied on the test applied in
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), as
the proper one to be applied in these situations:
"[W]hether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
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objection is made has been come at by exploitation
of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1969) ." Id. at
241.
The following testimony clearly establishes that Miss
Edwards' in-court identification was based on what she
remembered from the experience in the motel room rather
than the lineup, thus meeting the test of being sufficiently distinguishable as to be "purged of any primary
taint:,,

"Q. Was the identification which you made
of defendant based upon what you observed in the
motel A.

I based it on what I saw in the room.

Q. And what you felt in the room when you
brushed the jacket?

A. Yes.
Q. Alright. Did any police officer ever tell
you what this man looked like?

A.

No.

Q. Did anyone show you a picture of this
man or any other - explain to you anything about
he or his physical appearance between the time
you - of the night of the offense and the time
that you pointed out these characteristics at the
preliminary hearing?

A.

In the lineup when I saw him.

But did anybody point out to you that
individual?
Q.
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A.

No, No.

Q. At the time of the lineup, did anybody
point out the man holding sign number three and
say he is the man taken out of that motel?

A.

No" (T. 196).

Miss Edwards' detailed description of Harris' facial
characteristics is sufficient to support her in-court identification regardles of any subsequent viewing:

"Q. Now then, Miss Edwards, at the time
you were in the bathroom of the motel and the
door was opened and you were handed your
blouse, you indicated you observed certain characteristics about the individual that handed the
blouse to you. What were those characteristics?
A.

his coat.

His hairline, his sideburns, his shirt and

Q. And did you observe anything else about
the facial area, or anything of that nature?

A. The texture of his skin.
Q.

skin?

What do you mean by the texture of his

A. I mean the marks where he had shaven
and had rough skin (T. 161-162).
Q.

saw?

What was the color of his hair, if you

A. It was a dark brown (T. 163).
Q. Was the hair characteristics, the hairline, the sideburns and the facial complexion of
the same type [at the preliminary hearing] that
you saw in the motel that night?

A.

Yes" (T. 164-165).

At the preliminary hearing a card was held up to
Harris' face leaving exposed only the right side. Miss
Edwards' identification was based solely upon her recollection of this side of his face from the motel room:

"Q. So when you went to the preliminary
hearing and made this identification, was that
based solely upon your observation, or were you
kind of supported a little bit in your decision
based upon what the police officers may have told
you?
A. His face, the side of his face was familiar
when I did see it again" (T. 107).
Whether Miss Edwards really recognized Harris in
court from her observation of him in the motel room was
for the trial court to decide, which decision should not be
reversed on appeal:
"The question whether the lineup was unfair
and likely to bring about an improper identification, and thus so taint the evidence that it is unfair to use it, is something which must necessarily
rest largely within the discretion of the trial court.
When the question arises, it is his responsibility
to inquire into the facts and make a ruling thereon ... If the evidence is admitted, the procedure
followed with respect to the lineup can be shown
to the jury so that any question of its unfairness
may be considered by the jury as bearing upon
the question of credibility of the identification,
which is for the jury to determine along with all
of the other evidence in the case." State v. Ervin,
supra, at 221.
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In the present case the lineup procedure was called
to the attention of the jury in detail. Any possible unfairness in this procedure should have been in the minds
of the jurors when called upon to deliberate.
Also, in State v. Spencer, 24 Utah 2d 361, 471 P. 2d
873, (W70), this Court recognized that the question of
lineup unfairnE:ss is for the jury to decide:
"He says those cases hold that an improper
lineup is so likely to affect the subconscious mind
of one who views it that when that person later
says positively that he recognizes the defendant,
the testimony cannot stand and the defendant
must be freed of any charges which depend upon
an identification.
"'This specious argument completely ignores
the functions of jurors, who weigh testimony and
give such effect to it as under all the circumstances they deem proper. Whether the witness
really recognizes a defendant in court as being a
robber is, of course, a matter for the jury to decide." Id. at 363.
The Supreme Court of Arizona found, as did this
Court in State v. Vasquez, supra, that in-court identification based on an independent source will stand despite
suggestive lineup:
"Here, the record supports the conclusion
that although the pretrial identification _was unduly suggestive, the in-court identification had
an independent source other than the lineup.
" . . . [I] t was not conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification." State v. Dessureault,
104 Ariz. 380, 453 P. 2d 951, 955, 956 (1969).
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This Court held in State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d
202, 468 P. 2d 639 (1970), that " ... [W]hen the guilt is
by other untainted evidence so overwhelmingly
that there is no likelihood whatsoever of a different result
in the absence of such error or irregularity, there should
be no reversal." Id. at 208. Review of the transcript will
reveal that in the present case there is an abundance of
untainted evidence which all sustains the jury findings.

B. Harris effectively waived his right to counsel.
Harris was informed of his right to counsel at the
time he was arrested. There is no police testimony to
the effect that he specifically requested counsel prior to
the lineup. In fact, Sergeant Dyer asked Harris prior
to the lineup if he desired counsel and received a negative
reply. Through his failure to request and his negative
reply in regard to counsel Harris effectively waived this
right.
C.

Possible error associated with absence of
counsel was overcome by in-court identification based on independent source.

If, however, it should be determined that there was
error associated with absence of counsel during lineup
procedure such error was overcome by in-court identification based on independent source. United States v. De
La Cruz Bellinger, 422 F. 2d 723 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Cunningham, 423 F. 2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1970).
The fact that there was not counsel present at the lineup
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does not prejudicially affect Miss Edwards' in-court
identification of Harris based upon her observation of
him in the motel room on the night of the offense.
In State v. Vasquez, supra, this Court found:

"It is conceded that Vasquez was not advised
that he could have counsel present at the lineup,
nor that he knew in advance that a lineup was to
take place.
"The record before this court does permit an
independent judgment and discloses that Coxey's
in-court identification had an independent source,
namely, Coxey's description of the automobile
and its occupants and his identification of Vasquez and the other four defendants shortly after
the occurrence and during the course of their apprehension." Id. at 279.
POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
S U B M I T LESSER OFFENSES TO THE
JURY.
Authorities generally agree that where parties request jury instructions on lesser offenses, they are entitled to have instructions given upon their theory of the
case if there is any substantial evidence to justify giving
such an instruction. State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d- 372, 463
P. 2d 811 (1970); State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185
P. 2d 738 (1947).

The trial court has no duty to give an instruction
on simple assault or any other lesser offense unless it is
obvious from the evidence that such an instruction is
appropriate. Where there is evidence to justify a question in the mind of a reasonable man whether the act as
charged was, in fact, completed, then it is proper for the
Court to submit the question to the jury along with instructions on lesser included offenses. State v. Hunter,
20 Utah 2d 284, 437 P. 2d 208 (1968).
In the case at bar the evidence is such that there
can be no question in the mind of a reasonable man that
Harris both intended and committed all the essential
elements of the crimes of rape, robbery and second degree kidnapping.
A. Emission is not essential to constitute the
crime of rape.
In regard to rape, we not only have Miss Edwards'
explicit and uncontradicted testimony but Dr. Stevenson's testimony which is conclusive as to the occurrence
of sexual intercourse within about a six to twelve hour
period (T. 209, 217).
Appellant argues that since Dr. Stevenson's examination produced no live sperm it is doubtful that an
emission occurred and thus the lesser offenses should
have been submitted. Emission, however, is not essential
to constitute the crime of rape. State v. Warner, 79 Utah
500, 291 P. 307 (1930), rev'd. on another point 79 Utah
510, 13 P. 2d 317.
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All that is essential to constitute the crime of rape
is stated in the Code:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-53-17 (1953) states: "[T]he
essential guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the person and feeling of the female. Any sexual penetration,
however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime."
as:

Utah Code Ann. § 76-53-15 (1953) defines "Rape"
"[A]n act of sexual intercourse accomplished
with a female, not the wife of the perpetrator,
under any of the following circumstances:
" ( 4) Where she is prevented from resisting
by threats of immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution. . . ."

B. Harris was a "principal" in the crime of robbery.
The Court properly instructed the jury that all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, either a
felony or misdemeanor, whether they directly commit the
act constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission are principals in any crime so committed. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-44 (1953). State v. Angelos, 25 Utah
2d 20, 474 P. 2d 731 (1970).
Harris was a "principal" in the crime of robbery. One
who is a principal cannot be an accessory after the fact.
People v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 P. 737 (1891). When
Burney asked Miss Edwards to give him the $50 bill
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afi2r having told Harris that she had one, there was no
objection from Harris (T. 142-143). When Burney then
asked for the rest of the money, Harris said to let Miss
Edwards keep the five and ones. Harris did not tell
Burney to let her l:eep the $50 bill. The transcript is
clear on this point (T. 173). Burney told Miss Edwards
that their intention was just to rob her (T. 178).
C. Secret detainment constitutes kidnapping
rather than false imprisonment.
Miss Edwards was secretly detained, thus constituting the crime of kidnapping rather than false imprisonment. State v. Olsen, 76 Utah 181, 289 P. 92 (1930).
The transcript is replete with evidence of the precautions of secrecy used by Harris and Burney in detaining Miss Edwards (T. 142, 155-156). She was blindfolded,
forced to ride to and from the motel reclined in the back
seat, and forced to walk with her back to her offenders
while they drove. Fingerprints were also removed from
her car.

CONCLUSION
Harris received a fair trial and was convicted of the
crimes of rape, robbery and second degree kidnapping
based upon good and sufficient evidence. There was no
prejudicial error committed at the time of the lineup and
the court was warranted in not submitting instructions
on the lesser included offenses. It is respectfully submitted that the conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N.BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

